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“Nation brand is national identity made tangible, robust, communicable
and above all useful.” 
– Simon Anholt, 2008
Just when the hegemony of the national form seemed well and truly on the wane,
its claims to authority and legitimacy compromised by all manner of networks,
“scapes” (Appadurai, 1997), and flows, a series of contemporary events has re-
ignited the national discourse. Current crises of value—economic, political, cul-
tural, and moral—have raised the possibility that the protections and provisions
offered by the nation-state may be powerful antidotes to the anxieties of global
disjunctures. Amid calls to regulate and rebuild the architecture of global integra-
tion, the potential of the national imaginary has come once again to the fore. 
As national leaders try to re-assert their jurisdictional boundaries, they have
drawn heavily on their countries’ cultural identities to promote their constituen-
cies as exemplars of both domestic distinction and international fitness.1 Along
with declining possibilities for investment in tangible sources of national wealth,
a country’s intangible wealth—its “good reputation”—is increasingly evoked as
a means to gain the most prominent seat at the appropriately high-stakes table.
The problem is that there are many tables to sit at; and it is not always clear how
to construe” this reputation in a way that is equally appealing to all possible play-
ers. National governments have been convinced of the need to harness, measure,
and market this valuable resource, and they have turned to the experts in “repu-
tational value” to help them do so. These experts are nation-branding consult-
ants,2 and their self-styled raison d’être is to create and communicate a particular
version of national identity that will make the nation matter to a wide range of
audiences. With their quasi-academic journals and textbooks,3 proprietary indices
and rankings of metrological effectiveness, and an acute awareness of the power
of the press release, nation branders purport to offer national leaders the “robust”
identity they require to retain both their own and their jurisdiction’s relevance in
the context of global transformation.
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My research is concerned largely with trying to understand how we got here;
that is, to highlight the conditions that have led us to assert the need to make
national identity “useful” and to ask about the implications that the principles and
practice of nation branding might have for our self-understanding as national cit-
izens and global subjects, for our commitment to the terms of political self-deter-
mination, and for our ideals of public communication. A number of problematic
assumptions underpin the injunction to brand, which are questioned too infre-
quently by nation branding’s proponents and practitioners. Using the tools, tech-
niques, and expertise of corporate promotion to narrate national interests does
indeed “re-territorialize” the nation, though as the clients of these nation branders
have found, it is often on fairly shaky grounds.4 If the brand has become a dom-
inant genre by which the nation is expressed, what other formations and fantasies
are elaborated in the process? 
One such conceptual shift has been the perception by governments that they
must act decisively in the face of globalization. Presented by turns as symptom
and cause, framed as inexorable and endemic, globalization is constituted as an
agentless imperative requiring drastic and immediate measures by nation-states
to either surf or stem its tides. But as Neil Brenner, among others, has pointed out,
globalization is an “essentially contested term” (Brenner, 1999, p. 39) that
indexes a vast range of research areas and forms: economic studies of labour and
organization; issues of citizenship, migration, and mobility; factors in cultural
production and protection; and studies of political power and democratic trans-
formation. Moreover, the fervour of rhetorical justifications for change in the
name of globalization does not appear to be matched by its practical effects.
Indeed, as Colin Hay and his colleagues (Hay, 2006; Hay & Marsh, 2000; Hay &
Rosamond, 2002) have repeatedly and rather convincingly shown, discourses and
rhetorics of globalization are at least as likely (if not more so) to engender policy
change as any material factors. As such, a nuanced understanding of globaliza-
tion requires us to investigate not only the impact of material realities on policy
and social structure, but also the ways in which ideas of globalization become
institutionalized and normalized, since policymakers and governments enact
decisions in their jurisdictions informed equally by empirical and ideational fac-
tors (Hay & Rosamond, 2002).5 Ironically, the indeterminacy of the globalization
idiom appears to be the key to its effectiveness in the paradigm of the nation-as-
brand, for the “new and improved” national identity is proffered as a solution to
the global on multiple fronts. The brand is meant to represent the nation’s distinct
and unique value among diverse international publics: investors, tourists,
migrants, workers, scholars, arts and sports franchises—anyone who might have
cause to bring their economic, symbolic, or human capital to bear on one country
instead of another, equally viable option.
The issue then becomes one of determining how to name and define this
value. Thus a second facet of the brand’s appeal in this context is its pretence to
mediate the nation’s value as both a market and a moral category. Just as brand
value in the corporate world can now be monetized on asset statements independ-
ently of the object itself, its conditions of labour, and the site of its production, so
national identity can now be made tangible through the proprietary tactics of the
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nation-branding consultants, who develop and conduct public-opinion polls, sur-
veys, focus groups, and other instruments to obtain purportedly quantifiable met-
rics in order to rank their clients’ “national assets, characteristics, and competence”
(Anholt, 2007, p. 2). One prominent example is the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation
Brands Index, developed by the “guru” of the nation-branding movement, Simon
Anholt—who, if his book jacket is to be believed, also coined the term.6 This
index takes the pulse of international public perception by polling individuals in
50 countries about their views of a target country’s structure of governance,
exports, tourism, people, culture, heritage, investment, and immigration. “Every
responsible government in the global age,” writes Anholt in a 2007 report, is duty-
bound to take steps in the management of their nation’s reputation, since 
the only sort of government that can afford to ignore the impact of its
national reputation is one which has no interest in participating in the
global community, and no desire for its economy, its culture or its citi-
zens to benefit from the rich influences and opportunities that the rest of
the world offers them. (Anholt, 2007, p. 13)
A key dimension of the nation-branding process is to assemble, in the early
stages, a number of different groups—business interests, government parties,
civil society actors, and citizens—in a “grassroots”–style approach to the creation
of the new national identity. The premise is that in order to be effective, the brand
must be the conceptual product of all of its “owners” or “stakeholders,” as
national constituents are called in this context. Moreover, implicating individuals
from multiple levels of society in discussions about how to define the national
self appeases those who would criticize the practice’s potential for elitism. 
This premise is undermined, however, in at least two crucial ways. First,
positioning constituents, rather than brand consultants, as the “owners” of the
brand effectively releases the consultants from any responsibility for its effective-
ness. True to their professional category, nation-branding consultants see their
work not as an act of creation, but as one of facilitation, guidance, or “teaching,”
as one consultant I interviewed put it. Their own role is necessarily short-lived,
allowing them to move on to other lucrative projects elsewhere. Unfortunately,
my research suggests that this is sometimes also a goal of the government actors
in the branding process. While the state helps to foot the bill to create these iden-
tity narratives, making use of national cultural production as well as sentiments
of cultural sovereignty to “repatriate difference” (Appadurai, 1997) and creativ-
ity within the country’s borders, these narratives often accompany a concomitant
decline in state accountability and responsibility with respect to culture. Indeed,
the ultimate responsibility for the brand’s success or failure lies neither with the
consultants nor with the state, but with its citizens, who are enjoined to “live the
brand” and embody its values and are castigated for being poor cultural ambas-
sadors if they do not. 
This, I suggest, is where the phenomenon becomes most problematic.
Though national projects of sovereignty and self-determination have always been
determined to a certain extent by international forces, this version of “global
nationalism” (Sklair, 2001) is about something more. It is not merely a matter of
marketing distinctly Canadian or Macedonian or Jamaican goods or services
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abroad; attracting the “right” kinds of investors, skilled immigrants, or tourists;
or ensuring that the country’s political and cultural luminaries have the right
angle and degree of international spotlight. Put simply, nation branding purports
to be about what it means to call oneself a national citizen. 
What is contained within these objectives to make national identity “robust”
and “useful” is the presumption that the prior version of national identity was nei-
ther. Consultants see their work as helping to improve an identity that is “always
already there.” As with nationalist discourses, which appeal to the primordiality of
certain categorical identities within the nation, here too national identity appears
as a prepolitical, given force, neutral until taken up by nation-branding consult-
ants, subjected to evaluation, and mobilized for the cause at hand. And if national
identity is constituted in this paradigm as prepolitical, the work of nation-branding
is presented as postpolitical—where the nation remains necessary not as a demo-
cratic resource for active participation or equal recognition, nor as a geopolitical
force to mediate international conflict, but as an ensemble of non-threatening frag-
ments of culture, history, and geography determined by committee. This is the
basis of the brand’s rising popularity in foreign-policy circles as a vehicle for pub-
lic diplomacy.7 In its ability to combine diverse motifs of heritage and moderniza-
tion, domestic and foreign concerns, and economic and moral ideologies, nation
branding is presented as a “2.0” version of nationalism, as a more progressive form
of patriotism than its chauvinistic or antagonistic counterparts.
In his classic set of lectures, How to Do Things with Words (1962), the
philosopher John Austin explores the meaning of “perlocutionary” acts, describ-
ing these not as rhetorical utterances, nor as statements of truth or falsity, but
rather as a kind of performance, with practical effects as well as conceptual con-
sequence. Perlocutionary acts are “what we bring about or achieve by saying
something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or
misleading” (p. 109). Of what, indeed, are we persuaded or convinced by the
nation-brand paradigm? And what is achieved by this conviction? The task at
hand is to contemplate what sorts of “expert” knowledge are institutionalized and
normalized by the process and how these knowledges participate in re-framing
national identity as a cultural form.
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Notes
1. I do not mean to suggest that the politics of identity were not in play in previous articulations of
national sovereignty. Indeed, the assumption that identity-based appeals in contemporary politics
mark a break from previous paradigms, as Craig Calhoun (1995) argues, is most often an ideo-
logical stance contrived to separate what ought to be seen as “properly political” from represen-
tations of power in other realms. 
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2. By “consultants” I mean to refer to a category of professionals whose primary role is to offer advi-
sory services to national leaders in the general arenas of reputation, image, and identity. This
includes a highly circumscribed group of individuals and firms devoted to the practice of nation
branding specifically, but it can also extend to encompass advertising and marketing executives,
“creativity” or “competitiveness” gurus, business and social science academics, and others who
see their work as influencing policy prescriptions that regulate the intangible attributes of coun-
tries for the purposes of national development.
3. Recent textbooks include Jaffe & Nebenzahl (2006) and Dinnie (2008). 
4. For specific examples from my research of nation branders’ identity strategies and their implica-
tions for distinct territories, see Aronczyk (2008b).
5. Monica Prasad (2006) makes a trenchant case along these lines in an extensive study of the rise
of free-market policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Although globaliza-
tion is invoked repeatedly by these countries’ political leaders as a causal factor in the adoption
of these policies, Prasad finds little empirical evidence to support this. It was less globalization
that instigated such policies in these countries, she suggests, than aspects of the political process
that fostered general impressions of the need for global competitiveness. 
6. While not comparable directly in terms of scope or purpose, other national “image”- or “value”-
based ranking systems contribute to the nation brand’s overall effects. The World Values Survey
(www.worldvaluessurvey.com), for example, which employs far more exhaustive and long-range
metrics than the Nation Brands Index, is used widely in European countries. Some systems claim
to measure perceptions in individual categories of national reputation, such as the Country Brands
Index (for tourism-related perceptions), developed by FutureBrand/Weber Shandwick, and the
Corruption Perceptions Index, monitored and prepared by Transparency International
(www.transparency.org). 
7. For some overviews of the relationships between public diplomacy, “soft” power, and brand strat-
egy, see Mark Leonard (2002) and the articles in Jan Melissen (2005) and Cowan & Cull (2008).
Websites
The World Values Survey. World values survey: The world’s most comprehensive investi-
gation of political and sociocultural change. URL: http://www.worldvalues
survey.com.
Transparency International. CLARITY for brands. URL: http://www.transparency.com.
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